With S-400s Out, Russia’s Days Of Controlling Syria’s Airspace Are Over

As a part of its drawdown from Syria following the dramatic collapse of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in early December, Russia has packed up a few of its most superior S-400 and S-300 air protection missile programs. The switch marks the tip of an period when Russia performed an arguably outsized function in figuring out which nations may function in Syria’s contested airspace for nearly a decade.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Russian cargo planes have transported S-400 and S-300 radars out of Syria to bases in jap Libya, managed by the Russian-allied warlord Khalifa Haftar.

Haftar would doubtlessly welcome the deployment of those strategic air protection programs as a counterbalance towards his Turkish-backed rival, the UN-recognized authorities in Tripoli, which unsurprisingly opposes Russia reinforcing its bases within the divided nation. Haftar fought that authorities in 2019-20 when his forces besieged and tried to grab the capital, solely to be routed by a counteroffensive supported by Turkish drones. The battle has remained stalemated ever since. Rumors abound in 2020 that Russia deployed S-400s or S-300s to jap Libya, which, as famous on the time, may have helped solidify that stalemate. Haftar has lengthy been “obsessed” with having Russian air defenses deployed within the areas he controls to keep away from a repeat of that yr’s humiliating rout.

Retaining S-400s in Syria not serves Russia’s strategic pursuits for the reason that programs grew to become extra uncovered following the takeover of the nation, together with Latakia, by anti-Assad armed teams.

“The removing of S-400 missile protection programs from their positions on the Hmeimim air base seems to be the primary clear signal that preparations are underway for the bottom’s full evacuation,” wrote analyst Anton Mardasov in Al-Monitor. “However, by Dec. 8, the continued presence of those costly programs had already grow to be irrelevant when opposition forces entered the city of Jableh, from the place they might successfully shell the whole base.”

When Russia initially intervened within the Syrian civil conflict to prop up Assad’s regime in late September 2015, it deployed Sukhoi fighter-bombers at Hmeimim airbase, situated within the coastal Latakia province. The solely air defenses it deployed at that base have been medium-range level protection programs just like the Pantsir-S1, a sensible transfer contemplating the bottom later got here below assault by explosive drones.

Off the Syrian coast, the Moskva was deployed within the early levels of Moscow’s air marketing campaign with its naval S-300s to offer extra protection. Incidentally, that was the identical guided missile cruiser Ukraine sank within the Black Sea on Apr. 13, 2022, one other putting reminder of how occasions have modified.

When Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 Fencer bomber that briefly entered its airspace on Nov. 24, 2015, Russia slapped sanctions on Turkey, leading to months of tense relations between the nations. During that point, Russia deployed S-400s to Hmeimim, significantly enhancing its air protection protection over Syria, a minimum of in concept.

“The S-400 is one in every of Russia’s most trendy air protection programs with a unprecedented attain,” the BBC reported on the time. “From the airbase close to Latakia the S-400’s surface-to-air missiles may strike targets in an arc that takes in a lot of Israel; the jap Mediterranean (together with Cyprus the place British jets are primarily based); and northwards to cowl a big a part of Turkey past the Syrian border.”

However, Syria’s topography posed challenges for these strategic air defenses. As navy aviation author Tom Cooper famous in 2017, Hmeimim was mere miles from the Alawite Mountains, severely proscribing their radar protection, and with that, the S-400 interceptor missiles’ potential to succeed in their most marketed ranges of as much as 250 miles.

Still, the S-400 deployment enhanced Russia’s stature, a minimum of symbolically. Turkey apologized for the Su-24 shootdown by mid-2016, and shortly after the Jul. 15, 2016, coup towards Ankara, ties between Ankara and Moscow grew ever hotter, culminating in Russia delivering S-400s to the NATO member nation in July 2019.

“Moreover, have been it not for the Syrian civil conflict, Turkey would virtually actually not have purchased the Russian-made S-400 missile system, which additional strained its relationship with the U.S.,” wrote Galip Dalay in December 2024. “Likewise, with Assad’s downfall, Turkey has damaged its earlier geopolitical encirclement by Russia on its northern, southern (Syria), and jap borders.”

Turkish cross-border operations into northern Syria from 2016 to 2019, which invariably focused Kurdish-led forces, hinged on prior approval from Russia to make use of Syrian airspace, underscoring Moscow’s purported management over a lot of the nation’s airspace.

Shortly after Russia intervened within the battle, Israel established a deconfliction mechanism to forestall their two overlapping air campaigns from clashing. Israel repeatedly cited the Russian navy presence in Syria as justification for not supplying Ukraine with armaments following Russia’s 2022 invasion.

At the identical time, Israel may have dominated Syrian airspace if it selected to however, extra for political moderately than navy causes, prevented unnecessarily clashing with Russia. However, there have been nonetheless some tense intervals.

For instance, in October 2018, throughout an Israeli airstrike in western Syria, an antiquated Syrian S-200 missile launched towards the incoming Israeli jets hit a close-by Russian navy transport killing all 14 Russian navy personnel on board. An enraged Russia blamed Israel and transferred a further S-300 to the nation, claiming it was for modernizing Syria’s air defenses. In actuality, it was crewed solely by Russian troops and was solely fired off as soon as with no radar lock in May 2022 throughout an Israeli airstrike. Ultimately, Russia eliminated the “Syrian” S-300 from the nation the next August, demonstrating the way it by no means belonged to Damascus to start with. (Interestingly, when Russia shipped out that system, it flew the radar from Hmeimim and loaded the battery onto a ship on the Tartus naval base. It’s possible shifting the S-300s and S-400s in an analogous method at this time.)

In retrospect, the entire “Syrian S-300” episode aptly demonstrated how symbolic Russia’s management over Syrian airspace actually was.

Less than a month earlier than its fateful February 2022 all-out invasion of Ukraine, Russia launched joint air patrols with the Syrian Air Force alongside the Golan Heights frontier with Israel. It claimed these can be a daily incidence. Moscow beforehand introduced it had linked its air defenses with these of the regime, doubtlessly rising the risk to any exterior plane unwelcome by Moscow and Damascus. Incidentally, between 2018 and 2020, Israel estimated it destroyed one-third of Syria’s air defenses throughout escalations with Damascus and Iranian forces and their militia allies within the war-torn nation.

Shortly after Assad’s ouster, Israel moved in and relentlessly bombed the remaining stockpiles of the Syrian navy, together with in Latakia and Tartus, with full impunity. In early October 2024, weeks earlier than Assad’s fall, Israel bombed an ammunition warehouse in Jableh close to Hmeimim, seemingly with little regard for a way Russia would possibly reply.

Today, Israel might be much less nervous than ever about what Russia thinks of its frequent incursions into Syrian airspace. The similar goes for Turkey, which can quickly play a extra vital function in policing Syria’s airspace in Russia’s place.

Whatever finally occurs, it’s already abundantly clear that the times of Russia having sway over who flies in Syrian skies have come and gone.