Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 30, 2024
Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans, Nate Trotter, and George Barros
November 30, 2024, 3:45 pm ET
Click right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click right here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cell gadget) is strongly advisable for utilizing this data-heavy instrument.
Click right here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces every day by displaying a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Note: The knowledge cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on November 30. ISW will cowl subsequent stories within the December 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Kremlin officers responded to Syrian opposition forces’ offensive into Syrian regime-held territory on November 29 and 30 and expressed curiosity in utilizing the Astana Process to answer the scenario. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 29 that the Syrian opposition forces’ offensive is an “encroachment on Syria’s sovereignty” and that Russia advocates for Syrian authorities to revive “constitutional order.”[1] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke on the cellphone with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on November 30 to debate the scenario in Syria.[2] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that each events expressed critical considerations in regards to the “harmful developments” in Aleppo and Idlib provinces. Lavrov and Fidan reportedly mentioned the necessity to coordinate joint Russian-Turkish actions to stabilize the scenario, primarily via the Astana Process that Russia, Turkey, and Iran launched in December 2016. (The Astana Process is a rival political course of to the United Nations [UN]-led Geneva Process below UN Security Council Resolution 2254.) Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi additionally reportedly initiated a phone dialog with Lavrov on November 30, throughout which Lavrov and Araghchi expressed “excessive concern” in regards to the “harmful escalation” in Syria.[3] Lavrov reportedly reaffirmed Russia’s sturdy assist for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and each agreed to accentuate joint efforts to stabilize and evaluation the scenario via the Astana Process. It stays unclear whether or not the Kremlin will have the ability to deploy further belongings to assist Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime given the excessive tempo and operational necessities for Russia to proceed conducting operations in Ukraine – the Kremlin’s precedence theater. Russia withdrew S-300 methods from Syria again to Russia in 2022, prone to assist Russian operations in Ukraine.[4] ISW collected unconfirmed stories in March 2022 that Russia withdrew Russian troopers and Wagner militants from Syria, prone to assist Russian operations in Ukraine.[5]
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un throughout his unannounced journey to Pyongyang on November 30.[6] Belousov and Kim mentioned the Russia-North Korea strategic partnership and relations between the Russian and North Korean militaries.[7] Kim reiterated assist for Russia’s battle in Ukraine and boilerplate rhetoric that the Kremlin makes use of to ahead its reflexive management marketing campaign aimed toward forcing the West into self-deterrence.[8]
Key Takeaways:
- Kremlin officers responded to Syrian opposition forces’ offensive into Syrian regime-held territory on November 29 and 30 and expressed curiosity in utilizing the Astana Process to answer the scenario.
- Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un throughout his unannounced journey to Pyongyang on November 30.
- Ukrainian forces just lately regained misplaced positions north of Kharkiv City, and Russian forces just lately superior close to Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
- Russian milbloggers continued to criticize poor Russian army command selections and poor coaching and self-discipline amongst Russian personnel.
We don’t report intimately on Russian battle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will proceed to judge and report on the consequences of those legal actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes in opposition to humanity although we don’t describe them in these stories.
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate principal efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the principle Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 30 however didn’t make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior close to Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha) and Darino and in jap Tolsty Lug (each southeast of Korenevo) and seized the rest of Darino, however ISW has not noticed affirmation of those claims.[9] Russian sources claimed that combating continued southeast of Korenevo close to Novoivanovka, Darino, Nikolayevo-Darino, and Nizhny Klin; northwest of Sudzha close to Sverdlikovo; and south of Sudzha close to Plekhovo.[10] A Ukrainian senior non-commissioned officer of an organization working within the Kursk course reported on November 30 that Russian forces are largely conducting assaults on foot in groups of three-to-five individuals and stopped utilizing heavy tools following harmful Ukrainian strikes, and are as a substitute utilizing all-terrain autos (ATVs), bikes, and buggies.[11] The officer said that Russian forces are concentrating reserve forces five-to-seven kilometers from the frontline however that Ukrainian strikes are stopping Russian forces from conducting rotations. Elements of the Russian fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly working in Kursk Oblast.[12]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported combating in Glushkovsky Raion west of the principle Ukrainian salient on November 30.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and method to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City)
Ukrainian forces just lately regained misplaced positions north of Kharkiv City amid continued Russian offensive operations within the Kharkiv course on November 30. Geolocated footage revealed on November 30 exhibits Russian forces hanging Ukrainian forces in a forested space southeast of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City), indicating that Ukrainian forces just lately regained tactical positions within the space.[13] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked with armored car assist between Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and Hlyboke.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian drone strikes are stopping Ukrainian forces from crossing the Vovcha River in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[15] Russian forces continued assaults alongside the worldwide border northwest of Kharkiv City close to Kudiivka, Hoptivka, and Kozacha Lopan; north of Kharkiv City close to Hlyboke; and northeast of Kharkiv City close to Vovchansk and Tykhe on November 29 and 30.[16]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Capture the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 30. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces superior close to Novomlynsk (north of Kupyansk and on the western financial institution of the Oskil River); northwest of Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk); as much as 500 meters close to Lozova (southeast of Kupyansk); in direction of Yampolivka (northwest of Kreminna); and in jap Terny (west of Kreminna).[17] A Russian supply claimed that Russian forces management half of Zahryzove (southeast of Kupyansk).[18] ISW has not noticed affirmation of those claims, nonetheless. Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Kupyansk close to Kolisnykivka, Pishchane, Lozova, and Zahryzove; west of Svatove close to Pershotravneve, Zeleny Hai, and Vyshneve; southwest of Svatove close to Druzhelyubivka, Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka; northwest of Kreminna close to Terny; west of Kreminna close to Yampolivka, Torske, and Zarichne; southwest of Kreminna close to Dibrova and the Serebryanske forest space; and south of Kreminna close to Hryhorivka.[19] Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly working close to Kopanky (west of Svatove); the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) close to Terny; and drone operators of the Russian sixteenth Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) close to Zarichne.[20]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Capture the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
A Russian milblogger claimed on November 29 that combating continues within the Siversk course northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka and east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske.[21]
Russian forces continued offensive operations close to Chasiv Yar on November 30 however didn’t make confirmed advances within the space. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing close to the southern outskirts of the refractory plant in Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar.[22] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces preserve defensive positions in Novyi Microraion in jap Chasiv Yar, however that Russian forces just lately seized a place in northern Novyi Microraion that might complicate Ukraine’s protection within the space.[23] The milblogger claimed that the Block-9 mine (south of Chasiv Yar) is a contested “grey” zone and that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking close to the mine. The consultant of a Ukrainian brigade working close to Chasiv Yar reported that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Ukrainian positions within the city and are attempting to flank Chasiv Yar from the north and south.[24] The consultant said that Russian forces haven’t established enduring positions on the west financial institution of the Siversky Donets Donbas Canal inside Chasiv Yar, however that Russian forces are penetrating Ukraine’s defensive traces in small teams. The consultant famous that Ukrainian drone operators are hanging Russian personnel concentrations within the space. Russian forces continued assaults north of Chasiv Yar close to Kalynove; inside Chasiv Yar itself; and south of Chasiv Yar close to Predtechyne, Stupochky, and within the course of Bila Hora on November 29 and 30.[25]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Toretsk course on November 30 however didn’t make confirmed advances. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade working within the Toretsk course reported that Russian infantry are attacking solely on foot in some areas of the Toretsk course and are utilizing autos to assist assaults in different areas of this course.[26] The commander said that the Russian army command just lately deployed extra forces to the Toretsk space as a way to penetrate Ukraine’s defensive traces. Russian forces continued assaults north of Toretsk close to Druzhba, close to Toretsk itself, and south of Toretsk close to Nelipivka and Shcherbynivka on November 29 and 30.[27]
Russian forces just lately superior south of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations within the course on November 30. Geolocated footage revealed on November 30 signifies that Russian forces just lately superior alongside the E50 freeway northeast of Hryhorivka (south of Pokrovsk), seized the rest of Yurivka (southwest of Hryhorivka), and superior west of Pushkine (additional southwest of Yurivka).[28] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 29 and 30 that Russian forces working south of Pokrovsk superior in direction of Ukrainka, to the outskirts of Novopustynaka, and likewise seized Zhovte, however ISW has not noticed affirmation of those claims.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that combating continued east of Pokrovsk close to Myrolyubivka, Myrnohrad, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka, Krasnyi Yar, and Krutyi Yar; and south of Pokrovsk close to Novyi Trud, Pustynka, Dachenske, Chumatske, and Zhovte on November 29 and 30.[30]
Russian forces just lately superior north and northwest of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations within the course on November 30. Geolocated footage revealed on November 29 signifies that Russian forces just lately marginally superior north of Novodmytrivka (northwest of Kurakhove).[31] ISW at the moment assesses that it’s unlikely that Ukrainian forces preserve a presence within the deep and slim salient within the area south and southeast of Novoselydivka, north of Illinka, and northeast of Berestky (all north of Kurakhove). Russian forces doubtless maintain positions in these fields given earlier geolocated footage of Russian forces working northwest and southwest of the fields. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 30 that Russian forces entered Stari Terny (north of Kurkahove and on the northwestern financial institution of the Kurakhivske Reservoir) however ISW has not noticed affirmation of this declare.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued unsuccessful floor assaults close to Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove close to Sontsivka, Zorya, and Novodmytrivka and within the course of Dachne; north of Kurakhove close to Berestky; and south of Kurakhove close to Dalne on November 29 and 30.[33] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly proceed to function close to Dalne; components of the fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously the first Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly working inside Kurakhove itself; and components of the 255th Motorized Rifle Brigade (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, SMD) and components of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (eighth CAA, SMD) are reportedly working within the Kurakhove course.[34]
Russian forces just lately superior northwest of Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations within the Vuhledar course on November 30. Geolocated footage revealed on November 29 signifies that Russian forces just lately marginally superior northwest of Trudove (northwest of Vuheldar) throughout a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces working northwest of Vuhledar superior in an space 2.47 kilometers extensive and 1.15 kilometers in depth west of Trudove and likewise superior close to Kostyantynopolske and Yansa Polyana.[36] Russian forces continued assaults north of Vuhledar close to Veselyi Hai, Romanivka, Yelizavetivka, Hannivka, Katerynivka, and Antonivka and northwest of Vuhledar close to Trudove, Rozlyv, Kostyantynopolske, and Sukhi Yaly on November 29 and 30.[37] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade are reportedly working within the south Donetsk (Vuhledar-Velyka Novosilka) course.[38] Elements of the Russian thirty third Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to Illinka.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border space on November 30 however didn’t advance. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 30 that components of the Russian thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) superior within the fields southeast and east of Blahodatne and that Russian forces superior southeast of Urozhaine (each south of Velyka Novosilka), though ISW has not noticed affirmation of those claims.[40] Russian forces continued attacking close to Velyka Novosilka itself; southwest of Velyka Novosilka close to Rivnopil, Novodarivka, and within the course of Novopil; and northeast of Velyka Novosilka close to Rozdolne on November 29 and 30.[41] Elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, fifth CAA, EMD) are reportedly working close to Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[42] Elements of the Russian 139th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (twenty ninth CAA, EMD) reportedly lower the T-0518 Kurakhove-Velyka Novosilka freeway close to Rozdolne, which a Russian milblogger claimed will complicate Ukrainian defenses within the space.[43]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Maintain frontline positions and safe rear areas in opposition to Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast together with north of Robotyne close to Novodarivka on November 30 however didn’t make confirmed advances.[44] The commander of a Ukrainian National Guard brigade warned that Russian forces proceed to organize for a future large-scale offensive operation in Zaporizhia Oblast and are accumulating and regrouping forces and tools within the space.[45] The commander famous that Russian forces are primarily conducting infantry assaults in Zaporizhia course however sometimes use bikes and all-terrain autos (ATVs). Elements of the BARS “Sarmat” volunteer detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly working within the Orikhiv course.[46]
The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy and Russian sources reported on November 30 that doubtless Russian shelling triggered the Russian occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to disconnect from the Ferrosplavna-1 energy line.[47]
Russian forces continued assaults within the Dnipro course, together with in east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast, on November 29 and 30 however didn’t make confirmed advances within the space.[48]
Ukrainian forces proceed to strike Russian air protection methods and radars in occupied Crimea.[49]Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian “Kasta-2e2” radar system and two “Podlyot” radar methods in occupied Crimea on November 29.[50]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces carried out a small sequence of drone strikes on Ukraine on the night time of November 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 10 Shahed drones and different unidentified drone sorts (presumably referring to decoy drones) from Kursk Oblast and Primorsk-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[51] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed eight drones over Kyiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson oblasts; that one drone grew to become “misplaced,” doubtless on account of Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) Interference; and that one other drone flew into airspace over occupied Ukraine. Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaly Kim said that Russian ballistic missiles triggered a hearth at an agricultural enterprise in Mykolaiv Raion.[52]
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash said on November 29 that some Russian Shahed drone variants with lowered payloads can fly round Ukraine for over 24 hours.[53] Yevlash famous that Russian forces modify the drones to have smaller warheads and bigger gas tanks, which permits them to fly for longer durations of time. Yevlash famous that the Ukrainian Air Force considers Russian drones to be “locationally misplaced” when the drones crash, run out of gas or expertise EW interference and reiterated that Russian forces are utilizing decoy drones with out warheads to overload Ukraine’s air protection methods.
Ukraine continues to depend on Western-provided methods to defend itself in opposition to large-scale Russian strikes. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky informed UK outlet SkyNews throughout an interview revealed on November 29 that that Ukrainian forces used F-16 fighter jets to destroy seven Russian cruise missiles throughout a large-scale Russian missile strike on Ukrainian infrastructure “two nights in the past,” doubtless referring to the large-scale Russian strike on the night time of November 27 to twenty-eight.[54] Zelensky famous that Ukraine doesn’t have sufficient F-16 plane or Patriot air protection methods to defend in opposition to large-scale Russian drone and missile strikes and known as on the West to offer further plane and air protection methods.
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian goal: Expand fight energy with out conducting common mobilization)
Russian milbloggers continued to criticize poor Russian army command selections and poor coaching and self-discipline amongst Russian personnel. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z teacher complained that the command of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], previously 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) is answerable for some assault components of the 109th Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st “Slovyansk” Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) and that the 132nd Brigade’s command despatched an injured soldier again to an assault firm within the Toretsk course.[55] The milblogger famous this can be a systemic drawback inside the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and different Russian models extra broadly. Another milblogger complained that Russian air protection forces within the close to rear often try and shoot down Russian drones on account of poor coaching, although Russian drone operators at all times inform Russian air defenses after they launch drones.[56] The milblogger proposed that the army command punish personnel who try and shoot down Russia’s personal drones.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 30 that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) and Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) carried out a joint air patrol over the Sea of Japan, East China Sea, and western Pacific Ocean.[57]
A Russian insider supply claimed that Russian regulation enforcement raids in opposition to nightclubs in Moscow, which Russian authorities carried out in a single day on November 29 to 30 to implement Russian censorship legal guidelines and the pseudo-state ideology, are literally meant to replenish the populations of penal colonies for Russian pressure era efforts.[58] Russian authorities beforehand carried out raids concentrating on migrant communities to coerce migrants into becoming a member of the Russian army and capitalize on xenophobia in opposition to migrants following the March 2024 Crocus terrorist assault in Moscow.[59]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian goal: Introduce technological improvements to optimize methods to be used in Ukraine)
Nothing vital to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian residents into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance methods)
ISW just isn’t publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied areas in the present day.
Significant exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group exercise in Belarus)
Nothing vital to report.
Note: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly accessible info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially accessible satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial knowledge as the idea for these stories. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/22533161
[2] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/information/1984573/
[3] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/information/1984580/
[4] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/standing/1563214929938694144; https://twitter.com/SamRamani2/standing/1563309536626151424; https://twitter.com/obretix/standing/1563520254386802691; https://twitter.com/YorukIsik/standing/1563501206668189697; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27; https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-ships-s-300-air-defence-missiles-out-syria-satellite-images-2022-08-29/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-mobilizes-reinforcements-syria-and-africa-ukraine;
http://syria dot television/%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD9percent82percentD9percent88percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D8percentA7percentD9percent84percentD8percentB1percentD9percent88percentD8percentB3percentD9percent8ApercentD8percentA9-%D8percentAApercentD9percent86percentD8percentB3percentD8percentADpercentD8percentA8-%D9percent85percentD9percent86-%D9percent85percentD8percentB3percentD8percentAApercentD9percent88percentD8percentAFpercentD8percentB9percentD8percentA7percentD8percentAA-%D9percent85percentD9percent87percentD9percent8ApercentD9percent86-%D8percentB4percentD8percentB1percentD9percent82percentD9percent8A-%D8percentADpercentD9percent85percentD8percentB5
[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924
[7] https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-russia-troops-ukraine-belousov-visit-35a6fd80f64ae2dd01637ed5e5b6451d ; https://t.me/tass_agency/288190 ; https://meduza dot io/information/2024/11/30/ministr-oborony-rf-andrey-belousov-vstretilsya-s-kim-chen-ynom-i-priglasil-voennyh-severnoy-korei-na-parad-9-maya; https://t.me/mod_russia/46353; https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1732968641-691807260/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-receives-russian-minister-of-defence/; http://rodong.rep dot kp/en/index.php?MTVAMjAyNC0xMS0zMC1IMDExQA==
[8] https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1732968641-691807260/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-receives-russian-minister-of-defence/; http://rodong.rep dot kp/en/index.php?MTVAMjAyNC0xMS0zMC1IMDExQA==; https://t.me/tass_agency/288191
[9] https://t.me/dva_majors/58963; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81645; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20126
[10] https://t.me/dva_majors/58963; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81645; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20126; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113; https://t.me/rusich_army/18902; https://t.me/dva_majors/58992
[11] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/30/obnulennya-zamist-rotacziyi-rosiyany-poshyryuyut-taktyku-zombi-shturmiv-j-na-kurshhyni/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM
[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/288202 ; https://t.me/ombr41/930
[13] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7689; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/4476
[14] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81619; https://t.me/motopatriot/29891; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113
[15] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20133
[16] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2854
[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/288201; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20130; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113
[18] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113
[19] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql; https://t.me/dva_majors/58963
[20] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146214; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146167; https://t.me/rian_ru/271014; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18167 ; https://t.me/sashakots/50496 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/21785
[21] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113
[22] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113 ; https://t.me/rybar/65831
[23] https://t.me/rybar/65831
[24] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rhp6uQ7g9Vw ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/29/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-bezuspishni-sproby-rosiyan-perejty-kanal-u-chasovomu-yari/
[25] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23420 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20165 ; https://t.me/rybar/65831
[26] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JFvyCBahZ_k ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/891931-aku-taktiku-zastosovue-rosijska-armia-na-toreckomu-napramku/
[27] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113
[28] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7696; https://t.me/jagers68/468; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7697; https://www.fb.com/3012NGU/movies/1103819791122910/ ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7697; https://www.fb.com/3012NGU/movies/1103819791122910/
[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60401
[30] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql
[31] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7687; https://t.me/hydra_subdivision137/60
[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/23420; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60401
[33] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql
[34] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13045 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146172; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81656 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81631; https://t.me/dva_majors/58951;
[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7686; https://www.fb.com/37obrmp/movies/592205193343557/
[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146113 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/58998; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/2747 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/standing/1862571235160240316
[37] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql
[38] https://t.me/voin_dv/12067
[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/58991
[40] https://t.me/ne_rybar/3208 ; https://t.me/rybar/65877
[41] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aRBawRAPHgoyUJFeLTL9LQgA6vowLBvdcG6yVTq7yixwnvrXCuagQnCmPampJ8Pml; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql
[42] https://t.me/voin_dv/12063
[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81611
[44] https://www.fb.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0cjBiYYm7frVp9WFRbLgtKKKt5zjD7Jp1QkXThCRkpFX4zt37EkdwCFPedk84ywXyl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11821
[45] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/891535-rosijska-armia-gotuetsa-do-nastupu-v-zaporizkij-oblasti-hilcenko/
[46] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6527
[47] https://t.me/energyofukraine/3302 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/891817-timcasovo-okupovana-zaporizka-aes-vcergove-vtratila-pidklucenna-do-odniei-z-zovnisnogo-linij-zivlenna-minenergo/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/288224
[48] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nh8CuqBLm9McEnYz2yN7ECCaf21Q4x9M7jPedUq3SUXj749R9E8wGGX8DC4Z8cCQl ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0twA2ug8EJqKjA58HhwAWWPoYbg3hpEygohFNvS7A5A2eSjf5r4oHYEMj7rGDhaBql
[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2024
[50] https://t.me/DIUkraine/4925 ; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/891833-v-okupovanomu-krimu-zniseno-tri-radiolokacijni-stancii-gur/
[51] https://t.me/kpszsu/23957 ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0dtgDgZYjZePvbpCcfscAcVVEfvMJiyYtBpyGxE2phs5w7nqKgsDgcZpsYaR9ecdMl
[52] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/12306; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/30/protyvnyk-udaryv-balistykoyu-po-mykolayivshhyni-ryatuvalnyky-likviduvaly-pozhezhu/
[53] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UeMazF9wqI ; https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/information/shahed-can-fly-for-up-to-24-hours-over-ukrainian-1732914439.html
[54] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924 ; https://information.sky.com/video/sky-news-speaks-exclusively-to-president-zelenskyy-about-putin-nato-and-trump-13263345 ; https://www.youtube.com/stay/7Df0DQ7GWUc ; https://suspilne dot media/892019-zelenskij-zaaviv-so-f-16-pid-cas-ostannoi-masovanoi-ataki-znisili-sim-rosijskih-raket/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/30/prezydent-rozpoviv-skilky-krylatyh-raket-znyshhyly-litaky-f-16-pid-chas-ostannoyi-ataky/
[55] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1745
[56] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18156
[57] https://t.me/mod_russia/46374
[58] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18156; https://t.me/tass_agency/288230 ; https://meduza dot io/information/2024/11/30/politsiya-provela-reydy-v-treh-moskovskih-nochnyh-klubah ; https://t.me/astrapress/69491; https://t.me/astrapress/69492
[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2024
