Thirteen years after the beginning of the Syrian rebellion, the swift and dramatic fall of Bashar al-Assad shattered the notion of a secure, albeit repressive, establishment. For a lot of the previous decade, Assad’s regime, bolstered by unwavering help from Iran and Russia, brutally suppressed dissent. What started as an rebellion in 2011 developed right into a devastating civil struggle that ultimately settled into an uneasy stalemate. Despite persistent challenges, Assad’s grip on energy appeared safe. Yet his regime collapsed inside days of the beginning of a coordinated insurgent offensive.
Among different casualties was Iran’s affect in Syria, painstakingly cultivated by means of years of expensive intervention and unwavering help. Tehran was Assad’s most steadfast ally all through the battle. Over the years, Iran invested immense sources and army help to make sure his survival. Yet because the Syrian army quickly disintegrated, Iran was notably absent. In the aftermath, Iran’s supreme chief, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, condemned Assad’s fall as a foreign-orchestrated conspiracy, a framing that displays Tehran’s efforts to protect its picture as a resilient regional energy. Within Iran, nonetheless, officers and observers seem divided. The fast tempo of occasions and the depletion of Tehran’s army and political sources over the previous 12 months, amid escalating direct and oblique army confrontations with Israel, have left the management struggling to formulate a coherent response.
Iran’s strategic setback presents the United States with a singular alternative to curb the potential for renewed battle and to put the groundwork for lasting stability in Syria. By persevering with to help Syrian Kurdish forces, selling dialogue amongst key Syrian stakeholders, and inspiring Israeli restraint in Syria, Washington may also help form the post-Assad actuality into one among long-term peace and safety. But stabilizing the area will even possible require Iran’s involvement in talks over Syria’s future. If Washington and Tehran fail to interact with one another, Syria will proceed to undergo.
EXPOSED EXHAUSTION
Iran’s intensive involvement in Syria’s civil struggle was instrumental in sustaining the Assad regime. Since 2011, Tehran has spent someplace between $30 billion and $50 billion on army help, oil transfers, and logistical help to Syria. The Quds Force, the elite wing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, coordinated operations early on by coaching native militias to strengthen the Syrian military and by mobilizing a big selection of overseas Shiite fighters, together with members of the Lebanese group Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and Afghan and Pakistani teams.
After large-scale combating subsided in 2018, Tehran started to deal with consolidating its affect in Syria’s south and southeast, securing management over territory and integrating the militias into the Syrian armed forces. But these efforts proved inadequate to forestall Assad’s fast collapse in early December. Iran seems to have been misled by the façade of a succesful and secure authorities in Damascus, despite the fact that Tehran itself had helped Assad craft this phantasm. The Iranian authorities remained unprepared for the Syrian military’s swift collapse, as defensive traces crumbled and troopers proved unready or unable to battle. In just some days, rebels seized Syria’s second-largest metropolis, Aleppo, and superior southward, leaving Iran with no time to reply successfully. As IRGC Chief Commander Hossein Salami admitted, Iran “couldn’t battle on behalf of the Syrian military . . . after they had been sitting idly by and watching.”
The weakening of Hezbollah additional compounded Iran’s challenges. Hezbollah was central to Iran’s technique in Syria, with 1000’s of its fighters deployed to help Assad’s regime during the last decade. After the loss of life of the Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, in 2020, Hezbollah turned the first coordinator of Iranian-backed militias in Syria. But Israeli strikes towards Hezbollah personnel and infrastructure during the last 12 months worn out management and prevented the group from providing Assad any additional army or logistical help.
Israel additionally intensified its focusing on of Iranian belongings in Syria. Initially geared toward disrupting Iranian arms transfers to Hezbollah through Syria, this technique turned a part of Israel’s broader confrontation with Hezbollah and the Iranian-backed “axis of resistance,” escalating right into a de facto land and air blockade by late 2023 that successfully lower off Iranian troop and logistics actions into Syria, notably by means of Iraq. Even Khamenei admitted in a speech in early December that Iran had been unable to offer Assad with help as a result of each entry level was successfully closed off.
Meanwhile, by the point the insurgent offensive in Syria started, in late November, the Iraqi Shiite militias that had performed a serious function within the early phases of the Syrian civil struggle had develop into unwilling to reenter the fray, preoccupied with home priorities and cautious of escalating prices of exterior intervention. This lack of dependable allied help left Iran constrained in its means to reply successfully.
Domestic elements additionally influenced Tehran’s selections to not interact. Two rounds of tit-for-tat with Israel, notably a collection of Israeli strikes on Iranian army websites and air defenses final October, had uncovered the Islamic Republic’s vulnerabilities. And Iran’s economic system is much much less strong at this time than when Tehran first intervened in Syria in 2011, limiting its capability to maintain one other expensive exterior engagement. Facing the probability of additional escalation, Tehran prioritized fortifying its defenses over diverting sources to overseas conflicts.
A FRACTURING AXIS
The fall of Assad not solely demonstrates Iran’s weaknesses but additionally poses important new challenges for Tehran, threatening each its regional affect and the regime’s stability. Foremost amongst these is the problem of revitalizing Hezbollah’s operational capabilities. Syria lengthy served as an important logistical hub within the “land hall” that linked Iran to the Mediterranean Sea and enabled the switch of superior weaponry and logistics to Hezbollah. With Assad’s collapse, this provide line has been severed, isolating Hezbollah and disrupting the axis of resistance’s geographical connectivity. Already weakened by a 14-month struggle with Israel, Hezbollah will now face the daunting activity of recovering with far much less direct logistical help from Iran.
Assad’s fall has additionally highlighted ideological and sectarian divisions amongst Iran’s allies that will additional fracture the axis’s cohesion. Iran, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis all considered the occasion as a serious setback. But Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Sunni teams that Iran helps, congratulated the Syrian rebels of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Islamist group, on their victory over Assad.
As far because the axis is anxious, shedding Syria might also undermine Iran’s credibility with its regional companions in Iraq and Yemen. Iran’s failure to intervene decisively in Assad’s protection will possible elevate doubts about its dedication and capability. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who maintained shut ties to Iran, expressed his shock over Tehran’s inaction in Syria throughout a tv interview simply after Assad’s fall. “I used to be stunned by . . . the place of these states that had been on Syria’s facet . . . Russia and Iran,” Maliki mentioned. “How did they alter [their position]? What are the implications of this alteration?” Going ahead, teams which have relied on Tehran’s help may now query its reliability
The lack of its ally in Syria will even drawback Iran in its rivalry with Turkey. Ankara’s robust help for Syrian rebels has disrupted the regional steadiness of energy. Under Assad, Iran’s intensive presence in Syria allowed Tehran to counterbalance Turkey’s regional ambitions. But since Assad’s fall, Ankara—now the principle patron of Syrian rebels, notably HTS—has changed Tehran and Moscow because the dominant exterior energy in Syria, increasing the breadth of Turkey’s affect whereas limiting Iran’s. There are rising issues in Iran that Turkey, emboldened by Tehran’s weakened place, may now search to extend its affect, at Iran’s expense, in Iraq, Lebanon, and the South Caucasus. In Iraq and Lebanon, Turkey may bolster its help for Sunni factions towards pro-Iranian Shiite teams. In the South Caucasus, Turkey’s push for the creation of the so-called Zangezur hall—a strategic transit route linking Turkey to Azerbaijan through Armenian territory—threatens to chop Iran’s land entry to Armenia, a strategic accomplice essential for sustaining Tehran’s regional foothold and commerce routes within the Caucasus, isolating it economically and geopolitically.
Finally, Assad’s fall has fueled home discontent amongst loyalists to the regime in Tehran, with some calling the loss a strategic blunder and overtly criticizing the federal government on state tv. For a regime closely reliant on fervent supporters, such dissent poses a severe problem. Moreover, there are fears that Sunni extremist teams in Iran’s restive southern areas, reminiscent of these populated by Arab and Baluchi teams, could also be emboldened by the victory of like-minded teams in Syria, risking additional unrest at a time when the federal government is more and more susceptible.
ONTO THE NEXT
Despite the numerous challenges going through Tehran, Iran is adapting its technique to protect affect in Syria and the Levant by making tactical changes. Iran has proven curiosity in partaking with Syrian Kurdish teams that, regardless of not difficult Assad straight, had been among the many key actors throughout the struggle, particularly within the battle towards Sunni extremist teams, and which retain management over massive components of northeastern Syria. In the lead-up to Assad’s ouster, Iranian-backed forces withdrew from key positions in japanese Syria, particularly within the Deir ez‑Zor province close to the Iraqi border, transferring management to the Syrian Democratic Forces, whose personnel and command construction are primarily Kurdish. This transfer signaled Iran’s effort to place itself as a possible accomplice to the Syrian Kurds, particularly given Kurdish issues that U.S. help for the SDF may diminish as soon as Donald Trump returns to the White House. (Many count on Trump to scale back American involvement in Syria and to hunt stronger ties with Turkey, which considers the SDF a terrorist group.)
Iran might also discover the potential of partaking with HTS, leveraging the anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian sentiments inside the rebels’ ranks. Although the HTS management has expressed its unwillingness to begin a battle with Israel, ongoing Israeli strikes and territorial advances in Syria may encourage a change of coronary heart. Tehran may supply help to HTS in alternate for strategic concessions, reminiscent of renewed entry to Hezbollah forces in Lebanon.
Alternatively, Iran may pivot to forging new ties with Shiite and Alawite minorities in western Syria who concern discrimination and repression by Sunni extremists. By aligning with these teams, Iran may construct a community of loyalist forces and proxies to maintain its affect in Syria even within the absence of a pliant ruling regime. Iran may even reorganize the tons of of Assad regime troopers that fled to Iraq right into a counterrevolutionary pressure, probably enabling it to regain a foothold in Syria.
FILLING THE VACUUM
The fall of Assad and the erosion of Iran’s foothold in Syria current a uncommon alternative for renewal but additionally immense challenges, the decision of which would require lively U.S. engagement. First, sustained U.S. help for the Syrian Kurds is essential. The Kurdish-led SDF has been a key ally within the battle towards the Islamic State, the jihadi terrorist group often known as ISIS, and a stabilizing pressure in northeastern Syria. But latest clashes with Turkish-backed insurgent teams have compelled the SDF to droop its operations towards ISIS. Continued U.S. help, together with monetary, political, and diplomatic help, will strengthen the Kurds towards such threats whereas deterring Iran from exploiting rising energy vacuums.
Washington should concurrently encourage Israel to restrain and de-escalate its operations in southwestern Syria. Following Assad’s fall, Israel has expanded its presence past the Golan Heights, occupying areas deeper inside Syria and justifying the transfer by citing safety issues. But any extended Israeli occupation dangers alienating Syrians and offering Iran with a pretext to reactivate its anti-Israel agenda in Syria.
The United States should additionally collaborate with allies within the Middle East and Europe to advertise an inclusive political dialogue amongst all Syrian factions. The energy vacuum left by Assad’s departure dangers intensifying competitors amongst varied factions and amongst nation’s many ethnic and spiritual minorities. Supporting complete dialogue would assist set up a consultant authorities that preserves Syria’s territorial integrity and protects minority rights, whereas lowering the probability that Iran or different exterior actors exploit minority teams to achieve affect.
Yet equally important to making sure safety in Syria shall be diplomatic efforts to forestall additional destabilization in Iran. Tehran’s rising sense of insecurity following Assad’s fall could drive the nation’s management to escalate actions that destabilize the area, reminiscent of efforts to additional strengthen allied militias in Iraq and Yemen or inciting sectarian tensions in Syria. The United States ought to, in actual fact, supply Iran a seat on the desk throughout regional talks over Syria’s future, addressing Tehran’s safety issues whereas calling on its management to de-escalate on different fronts. This technique may curtail Iran’s disruptive affect in Syria and the higher Middle East—and probably even open the door to extra complete diplomatic talks between Washington and Tehran.
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