Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 2, 2024
Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and George Barros
December 2, 2024, 5pm ET
Click right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date every day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click right here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular system) is strongly beneficial for utilizing this data-heavy device.
Click right here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces every day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Note: The information cut-off for this product was 11am ET on December 2. ISW will cowl subsequent stories within the December 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Prominent voices throughout the Russian data area proceed to emphasise that Russian President Vladimir Putin is tired of a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Ukraine that leads to something lower than whole Ukrainian capitulation. Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch and Orthodox nationalist and founding father of the ultranationalist Tsargrad outlet Konstantin Malofeev instructed the Financial Times (FT) in an interview printed on December 2 that Putin will possible reject any plan for peace negotiations that US President-elect Donald Trump places forth except the plan accounts for Russia’s “safety issues.”[1] Malofeev claimed that the Kremlin will solely contemplate peace negotiations with the Trump administration if Trump reverses the US coverage permitting Ukraine to make use of Western-provided long-range weapons to strike into Russia; “removes” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from workplace; and agrees to fulfill with Putin to debate the state of affairs in Ukraine, the longer term European safety, the battle within the Middle East, and Russia’s rising alliance with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Putin could intend to make use of such a gathering to extract future US coverage concessions on these points from Trump. Malofeev additionally claimed that the conflict in Ukraine has helped strengthen Russia’s relationships with the PRC, Iran, and North Korea and has revitalized Russia’s financial system and protection business. However, ISW continues to watch macroeconomic indications that Russia’s financial system is struggling to bear the burden of inflation, ongoing worldwide sanctions, and labor shortages and can face important challenges in 2025 assuming Russia’s conflict in Ukraine continues on the present tempo.[2]
Putin and different senior Russian officers have lately issued related statements. Malofeev’s interview additional signifies that the Kremlin just isn’t occupied with good religion negotiations, irrespective of who mediates such talks.[3] Malofeev doesn’t presently maintain an official place throughout the Russian authorities, however his rhetoric is necessary given his relationships with high-level Kremlin officers and the affect of Tsargrad amongst Russian ultranationalists.[4] Malofeev has beforehand used Tsargrad to advertise Kremlin narratives justifying Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine and continues to be an outspoken supporter of Putin.[5] Zelensky lately acknowledged that Ukraine should discover diplomatic options to finish the conflict and safe the return of some components of occupied Ukraine (together with Crimea) sooner or later, however Malofeev’s feedback point out that Putin stays averse to good religion negotiations and is dedicated to destroying the Ukrainian state by navy means.[6]
Russia’s elevated home manufacturing of Shahed-type drones has allowed Russia to extend the variety of drones it’s utilizing in strike packages launched at Ukraine, however Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) improvements are enabling Ukrainian forces to extra successfully reply to Russian strike packages. Ukrainian navy skilled Petro Chernyk instructed Ukrainian military-focused outlet ArmyInkind on December 2 that Russia has elevated the manufacturing of Shahed drone airframes whereas persevering with to depend on Iranian or Chinese imports for different drone elements.[7] Chernyk’s statements accord with ISW’s October 2024 evaluation that Russia is leveraging its domestication of Shahed-type drone manufacturing to extend the variety of Shahed-type drones it launches at Ukraine.[8] This dynamic is mirrored within the composition of the strike packages that Russia launched at Ukraine between October and November 2024, because it has turn into extra frequent for Russian forces to launch between 80 to 100 (or extra) Shahed and decoy drones as a part of their bigger strike packages.[9] Russian forces launched 110 Shahed drones and different unspecified drones, possible decoys, at Ukraine on the night time of December 1 to 2, for instance.[10] Russian forces most probably use giant numbers of Shahed-type drones and decoy drones to detect and overwhelm Ukrainian air protection and cellular fireplace teams; Russian forces most incessantly launch Shaheds alongside extra restricted numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles.
Ukraine seems to be responding to this inflow of Shahed drones in type, nonetheless. The variety of Shahed or decoy drones which can be reportedly “misplaced” (don’t attain their supposed targets) on account of Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) interference elevated considerably over the course of October and November 2024. Russia launched 105 Shahed-type drones at Ukraine on October 2, 78 of which Ukrainian forces straight shot down and 23 of which the Ukrainian Air Force reported have been “misplaced” on account of EW interference (22 p.c).[11] In distinction, Russian forces launched 110 Shaheds and decoys at Ukraine on the night time of December 1 to 2, 50 of which have been “misplaced” on account of Ukrainian EW interference (45 p.c), and 52 of which Ukrainian forces shot down.[12] Chernyk famous the excessive Ukrainian shoot-down fee and likewise emphasised that Ukraine has improved its EW capabilities to the extent the place Ukrainian forces can both “floor” the Shaheds, trigger them to get “misplaced,” or trigger them to deviate their paths and fly into Russian or Belarusian airspace.[13] Ukrainian EW interference is considerably impacting the efficiency of those Russian strike packages and notably including an elevated burden on the joint Russian-Belarusian air protection umbrella. Independent Belarusian monitoring group Hajun Project reported on November 25 that 38 Russian Shahed drones entered Belarusian airspace on November 24 and 25 – a report variety of Russian drones violating Belarusian airspace.[14] Belarus scrambled jets to answer the airspace violation—suggesting that Belarus was unprepared to obtain errant Russian drones and that Russia had not anticipated the impacts of Ukrainian interference or communicated them to Belarus upfront.
The Kremlin continues efforts to reduce the conflict’s social impacts on the Russian populace whereas tacitly resetting the goalposts for what the Kremlin initially outlined as victory in Ukraine. Russian enterprise outlet Kommersant, citing inside sources, reported on December 1 that Russian officers, together with these from the Presidential Administration, have set the next targets for the main United Russia occasion for the 2026 legislative elections: reaching 55 p.c of voter turnout and acquiring 55 of the whole votes; surpassing United Russia’s 2021 election figures; and emphasizing the necessity for optimistic framing of a potential conclusion to the conflict in Ukraine.[15] Kommersant additionally famous that the Presidential Administration is attempting to border “the longer term outcomes” of the conflict as a “victory” in a means that’s palatable to each pro-war ultranationalists and fewer ideologically-concerned Russian “liberals,” by focusing the framing of the conflict’s end result in a means that is acceptable to Russia’s “silent majority.” The Kremlin is looking for to border any end result of the conflict as a victory for the entire Russian populace. The Kremlin will possible concentrate on spinning rhetorical and summary achievements which can be troublesome to concretize, just like the “denazification” and “demilitarization” of Ukraine alongside the retention of annexed Ukrainian territories whereas deemphasizing damaging sentiments regarding the return of traumatized and injured conflict veterans, no matter how the conflict performs out for Russian forces on the battlefield.
Kommersant additionally famous that the Russian Presidential Administration is anxious with the rehabilitation and reintegration of traumatized Russian veterans into Russian society, indicating that Russian authorities are conscious of the potential home ramifications the return of numerous discontented veterans may have on Russian society. Russia’s unemployment fee is presently very low, and lots of Russian conflict veterans could discover themselves underemployed in the event that they return to civilian life. The Kremlin’s comparatively broad and ill-defined home informational efforts counsel that the Kremlin continues to be not sure of how the conflict will finish and is subsequently attempting to set pre-emptive societal circumstances to cope with the long-term results of the conflict, together with discovering a approach to promote Russia’s strategic and operational battlefield failures as victories. Russia has not achieved its self-defined aims of “denazifying” or “demilitarizing” Ukraine or seizing all Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
Pro-Kremlin Russian Telegram channel operators proceed to withstand Russian authorities efforts to deanonymize Russian social media accounts. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on December 2 that just about 90 p.c of the most important pro-Russian authorities Telegram channels haven’t but registered with Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor as of December 1, regardless of the Russian Ministry of Digital Development requiring social media channels with over 10,000 subscribers to register with the Russian authorities by January 1, 2025.[16] Verstka assessed that 82 of the highest 100 hottest Telegram channels, based on the TGStat catalog of Telegram channels, are pro-Russian authorities channels and that solely 10 of those 82 channels have registered with Roskomnadzor.[17] The Russian authorities is requiring such channels to supply “minimal” private details about the id of their operators by way of a particular platform or danger restrictions on promoting and their proper to be reposted by different channels.[18] Verstka reported that the highest 5 hottest Telegram channels – Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, a pro-war Russian navy blogger and information aggregator, Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, and Kremlin-awarded channel Rybar – haven’t but registered with Roskomnadzor, probably as a result of they’re already Kremlin-aligned and don’t threaten the Kremlin’s deserved management over public discourse in Russia.[19] Russian milbloggers beforehand criticized the deanonymization effort and can possible proceed to withstand ongoing Russian authorities efforts to observe and management the Russian data area.[20]
Key Takeaways:
- Prominent voices throughout the Russian data area proceed to emphasise that Russian President Vladimir Putin is tired of a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Ukraine that leads to something lower than whole Ukrainian capitulation.
- Russia’s elevated home manufacturing of Shahed-type drones has allowed Russia to extend the variety of drones it’s utilizing in strike packages launched at Ukraine, however Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) improvements are enabling Ukrainian forces to extra successfully reply to Russian strike packages.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to reduce the conflict’s social impacts on the Russian populace whereas tacitly resetting the goalposts for what the Kremlin initially outlined as victory in Ukraine.
- Pro-Kremlin Russian Telegram channel operators proceed to withstand Russian authorities efforts to deanonymize Russian social media accounts.
- Ukrainian forces lately superior close to Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces lately superior close to Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
- The Russian navy command is specializing in coaching extra Russian forces and enhancing Russian forces’ tactical assault operations.
We don’t report intimately on Russian conflict crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We will proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those prison actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We completely condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity although we don’t describe them in these stories.
- Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate primary efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations within the Russian Federation
Fighting continued in the primary Ukrainian Kursk Oblast salient on December 2, however neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing close to Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha), though ISW has not but noticed affirmation of latest Russian advances on this space.[21] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that combating continued southeast of Korenevo close to Novoivanovka, Darino, and Nikolaevo-Darino and southeast of Sudzha close to Pogrebki and Plekhovo.[22] Ukrainian navy officers famous on December 1 and a pair of that Russian forces assault Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast across the clock, generally with armored autos, and generally with lighter autos corresponding to bikes and all-terrain autos (ATV), which Russian forces use to move dismounted infantry to areas close to the frontline.[23] A Russian insider supply claimed on December 2 that Russian authorities have dedicated a minimum of 10 million rubles ($94,000) to a mission to show all the border into “one giant, fortified space” following the failure of the Russian defensive strains in Kursk Oblast to discourage the preliminary Ukrainian incursion into Kursk in August 2024.[24] A Russian insider supply claimed on December 1 {that a} Ukrainian HIMARS strike hit a command put up of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade in Kursk Oblast on November 30.[25] Elements of the Chechen “Aida” Spetsnaz group are reportedly working northeast of Sudzha, and components of the eleventh VDV Brigade are reportedly working all through Kursk Oblast.[26]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces performed offensive operations alongside the worldwide border north of Kharkiv City within the route of Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City close to Starytsya, Tykhe, and Vovchansk on December 1 and a pair of however didn’t make any advances.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces counterattacked in Vovchansk, close to Hlyboke, and within the Lyptsi route (each north of Kharkiv metropolis).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have periodically attacked close to Hlyboke and on its flanks to be able to minimize Russian forces off from floor strains of communication (GLOC) and reserves.[29] Elements of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly working close to the Belgorod Oblast worldwide border space.[30]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Capture the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 2 however didn’t make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior north of Kupyansk alongside the west (proper) financial institution of the Oskil River close to Novomlysk and southeast of Kupyansk close to Kolisnykvika, Kruhlyakivka, Zahryzove, Pishchane, and Berestove and west of Svatove close to Lozova and Zeleny Hai.[31] Several Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Russian forces working north of Kupyansk crossed the Oskil River and superior in a forested space west of Masyutivka (southeast of Dvorichna).[32] ISW has not noticed affirmation of those claims, nonetheless. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone unit working within the Kupyansk route said that Russian forces are trying to bypass Ukraine’s defenses close to Kupyansk and seize positions alongside the east (left) financial institution of the Oskil River.[33] The deputy commander said that Kruhlyakivka (southeast of Kupyansk) is a contested “grey zone.” Russian forces continued assaults southeast of Kupyansk close to Hlushkivka and Kruhlyakivka; west of Svatove close to Lozova and Zeleny Hai; southwest of Svatove close to Kopanky, Hrekivka, Cherneshchyna, and Druzhelyubivka; west of Kreminna close to Yampolivka, Terny, and Torske; and south of Kreminna close to Hryhorivka on December 1 and a pair of.[34] Elements of the Russian sixteenth Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working drones managed by way of fiber optic cables close to Zarichne (west of Kreminna), and components of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (twentieth Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly working close to Terny (west of Kreminna).[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Capture the whole lot of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka on December 2 however didn’t make any confirmed advances.[36] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasiya Bobovnikova that Russian autos are trying to advance throughout open fields within the Siversk route making it simple for Ukrainian forces to find and strike Russian forces.[37] Elements of the Russian “Nevsky” Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly working close to Vasyukivka (southwest of Siversk).[38]
Ukrainian forces lately superior within the Chasiv Yar route amid continued Russian offensive operations within the space on December 2. Geolocated footage printed on December 2 reveals components of the Russian “Shustry” detachment of Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (third Combined Arms Army [CAA], previously 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) hanging Ukrainian forces indicating that Ukrainian forces lately superior southeast of Chasiv Yar alongside the T0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka freeway.[39] Russian forces continued attacking inside central Chasiv Yar close to the refractory plant, close to Chasiv Yar, and north of Chasiv Yar close to Hryhorivka on December 1 and a pair of.[40] A Ukrainian senior non-commissioned officer of a brigade working within the Chasiv Yar route said that Russian forces try to “infiltrate” Chasiv Yar in teams of two to 3 personnel at nightfall and through poor climate circumstances to guard them from Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes.[41] The officer additionally said that Russian forces not often conduct mechanized assaults close to Chasiv Yar. Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly proceed working close to Chasiv Yar.[42]
Russian forces lately superior within the Toretsk route amid continued offensive operations within the space on December 2. Geolocated footage printed on December 2 signifies that Russian forces lately superior south of Toretsk to the Tsentralna Mine.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized two waste heaps close to the Tsentralna Mine, however ISW has not noticed visible affirmation of this declare.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked close to Toretsk itself; south of Toretsk close to Nelipivka; and west of Toretsk close to Shcherbynivka on December 1 and a pair of.[45] Bobovnikova said that Russian forces are conducting infantry assaults inside Toretsk since armored autos have problem shifting by city areas, however that Russian forces lately superior with armored car assist close to Nelipivka.[46] Bobovnikova additionally reported that Russian forces suffered over 500 casualties – a mechanized battalion’s price of personnel – throughout one week of assaults inside Toretsk.
Russian forces lately superior within the Pokrovsk route amid continued Russian offensive operations within the space on December 2. Geolocated footage printed on November 30 signifies that Russian forces lately superior inside Zhovte (south of Pokrovsk).[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior inside japanese Pushkine (south of Pokrovsk) and towards Novopustynka (southwest of Pokrovsk), however ISW has not noticed visible affirmation of those claims.[48] Russian forces continued attacking east of Pokrovsk close to Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk close to Lysivka and Krasnyi Yar; and south of Pokrovsk close to Novyi Trud, Dachenske, Zhovte, Chomatske, and Pushkine on December 1 and a pair of.[49] Elements of the Russian 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (fifteenth Motorized Rifle Brigade, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly working close to Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk).[50]
Russian forces lately marginally superior north and northwest of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations on this route on December 2. Geolocated footage printed on December 1 signifies that Russian forces lately marginally superior northwest of Sontsivka (northwest of Kurakhove) and west of Berestky (north of Kurakhove and on the northern shore of the Kurakhivske Reservoir).[51] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces keep positions in western Sontsivka, which is in step with ISW’s present assessed frontline.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are clearing or have seized Stari Terny (north of Kurakhove and west of Berestky), are advancing alongside Sobornyi and Myra streets in Kurakhove, and are advancing south of Kurakhove close to Dalne.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces occupy over half of Kurakhove, though ISW assesses that Russian forces presently solely occupy 39 p.c of the settlement.[54] Russian forces reportedly continued attacking close to Kurakhove itself; north of Kurakhove close to Berestky, and Stari Terny; northwest of Kurakhove close to Sontsivka, Zorya, Novodmytrivka; and south of Kurakhove within the route of Dalne on December 1 and a pair of.[55] Elements of the Russian fifth Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, previously 1st Donetsk People’s Republic’s Army Corps [DNR] AC) are reportedly working in high-rise buildings space in Kurakhove; components of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly working within the route of Dachne (northwest of Kurakhove); assault components of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (twentieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are working within the Kurakhove route; and drone operators of the third Tank Battalion of the 68th Tank Regiment (one hundred and fiftieth Motorized Rifle Division, eighth CAA) are reportedly working close to southern Kurakhove.[56]
Russian sources made unconfirmed claims on December 1 and a pair of that Russian forces superior northeast of Vuhledar, however ISW can not confirm these claims. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces gained a foothold on the southeastern outskirts of Yelyzavetivka (northeast of Vuhledar) and on the northwestern outskirts of Illinka (north of Vuhledar). A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces management 75 p.c of Romanivka (northeast of Vuhledar), however ISW noticed Russian forces function in 11 p.c of the settlement.[57] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that combating continued northeast of Vuhledar close to Yelyzavetivka; north of Vuhledar close to Hannivka and Antonivka; and northwest of Vuhledar close to Trudove and Kostyantynopolske.[58] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly working northwest of Maksymivka (northwest of Vuhledar).[59]
Russian sources claimed on December 1 and a pair of that Russian forces superior north of Velyka Novosilka within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast space, however ISW can not independently confirm these claims. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Novyi Komar (northeast of Vuhledar) and superior within the route of Rozlyv (northeast of Vuhledar).[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are enhancing Russian positions on Velyka Novosilka’s northern and southern flanks and disrupting Ukrainian logistics earlier than launching a “full-scale assault” on Velyka Novosilka.[61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that combating continued close to Velyka Novosilka itself; north of Velyka Novosilka close to Novyi Komar; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka within the route of Novopil.[62] Elements of the Russian thirty seventh Motorized Rifle Brigade (thirty sixth CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly working on the outskirts of Velyka Novosilka.[63]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Maintain frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)
Russian milbloggers claimed that positional combating continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 1 and a pair of however there have been no adjustments to the frontline.[64] A Russian milblogger amplified claims that Russian forces will renew offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast at an unspecified time after December 5 and that Russian forces might also try to cross the Dnipro River in an unspecified space in Kherson Oblast.[65] Drone operators of the Russian BARS-32 (Russian Combat Army Reserve) detachment are reportedly working in Zaporizhia Oblast.[66]
Russian forces continued assaults within the Dnipro route, together with in east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast, on December 1 and a pair of however didn’t make confirmed advances within the space.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 2 that the climate has reached freezing temperatures with the primary snowfall within the Kherson route.[68]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian navy and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces performed a big sequence of drone strikes on the night time of December 1 and a pair of. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 110 Shahed drones and different unidentified drone sorts (probably referring to decoy drones) from Kursk, Oryol, and Rostov oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[69] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 52 drones over Kyiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Poltava, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts; that fifty drone have been ”misplaced,” possible on account of Ukrainian digital warfare (EW) interference; that six drones returned to Belarusian or Russian airspace; and that one drone remained in Ukrainian airspace as of 0830 native time. Ukrainian sources reported on December 1 and a pair of that Russian drones struck residential buildings in Nizhinskyi and Prylutskyi raions, Chernihiv Oblast, and that falling drone particles broken buildings in Dnistrovskyi Raion of Chernivitsi Oblast; and {that a} Russian missile struck an condo constructing in Ternopil City.[70] Russian milbloggers claimed on December 1 and a pair of that Russian forces struck bridges in Poltava and Ternopil oblasts, protection industrial objects in Zhytomyr and Cherkasy oblasts, logistics targets in Khmelnytskyi and Mykolaiv oblasts, railway strains in Ternopil Oblast, and a Ukrainian warehouse in Rivne, Donetsk Oblast.[71] ISW has not noticed visible affirmation of those claims, nonetheless.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on December 2 that Russian forces launched 347 missiles of varied sorts, together with ballistic missiles, and over 2,500 Shahed strike drones towards Ukraine in November 2024.[72]
Independent Belarusian monitoring group Hajun Project reported on December 2 that 31 Russian Shahed drones entered Belarusian airspace on the night time of December 1 to 2.[73] The Hajun Project reported that the Russian drones flew in direction of the Belarusian settlements of Loyeu, Brahin, Rechytsa, Mazyr, Homiel, and Khoiniki and that a minimum of one drone circled between Russian and Belarusian air area a number of instances. The Hajun Project reported in late November 2024 {that a} report variety of Russian drones violated Belarusian airspace.[74]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian goal: Expand fight energy with out conducting normal mobilization)
The Russian navy command is specializing in coaching extra Russian forces and enhancing Russian forces’ tactical assault operations. The Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Main Combat Training Directorate, Colonel General Ivan Buvaltsev, claimed in an article printed within the MoD’s official publication Krasnaya Zvezda that the Russian navy educated over 300,000 contract servicemembers in reserve regiments, together with over 3,000 drone operators, for service in Ukraine in 2024.[75] Ruslan Pukhov, the top of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and a member of an MoD civilian advisory board, claimed in April 2024 that the Russian navy may recruit roughly 300,000 whole personnel in 2024 – and this declare is in step with Buvaltsev’s report of the whole variety of educated contract servicemembers this 12 months.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian navy is specializing in making ready troopers to function in fireteam-sized tactical assault models composed of two to 5 troopers and is prioritizing coaching drone operators and digital warfare (EW) system specialists.[77]
The Russian MoD is rising one-time funds to troopers from Russian federal topics whereas neglecting to pay forcibly mobilized servicemembers from occupied Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) reported that each Russian federal topic elevated its one-time funds to residents who signed a contract with the MoD a minimum of as soon as in 2024 and that the present common regional fee is 900,000 rubles ($8,450) per contract.[78] Vazhnye Istorii said that some federal topics elevated their one-time fee 75 instances in 2024, which signifies that some regional governments could also be struggling to fulfill their recruitment quotas greater than others. Vazhnye Istorii famous that new contract servicemembers additionally obtain 400,000 rubles ($3,756) from the federal authorities for signing a navy service contract, indicating that on common new contract servicemembers obtain a one-time fee of 1.3 million rubles ($12,206) after they signal a contract with the Russian MoD. ISW has beforehand assessed that ongoing efforts by Russian officers to extend one-time funds for contract service point out that the Russian navy is struggling to recruit a ample variety of volunteer servicemembers to switch Russian casualties in Ukraine and indefinitely delay or forestall one other partial involuntary reserve call-up.[79] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor said on December 2 that the Russian MoD is refusing to pay over 3,000 forcibly mobilized troopers from occupied Luhansk Oblast for his or her service and accidents sustained in fight.[80]
The Russian navy is more and more counting on non-public organizations to fulfill drone and EW system necessities on the frontline. The head of the Russian Center for Unmanned Systems and Technologies, Andrei Bezrukov, reported on December 2 that the middle, Russia’s ruling United Russia political occasion, and the “Our Right” fund delivered over 30,000 drones and 4,000 EW techniques to the Russian navy throughout an unspecified interval.[81] Bezrukov claimed that the middle is creating “particular expertise clusters” to decrease working prices and improve cooperation for dual-use startup corporations positioned on the Russian “Skolkovo” innovation middle.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian goal: Introduce technological improvements to optimize techniques to be used in Ukraine)
The Russian “MiS” design bureau claimed on December 2 that the corporate launched the “Povodyr” autonomous anti-electronic warfare (EW) system modification for the Russian MiS-35M drone, which permits the drone to autonomously fly again to its launch level after dropping connection throughout situations of EW interference.[82]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian residents into Russian sociocultural, financial, navy, and governance techniques)
ISW just isn’t publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied areas right this moment.
Significant exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group exercise in Belarus)
Nothing important to report.
Note: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorized materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the idea for these stories. References to all sources used are offered within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://www.ft.com/content material/ac39b604-ef6d-41cb-bb8c-0eb76e002176
[2] https://www.ft.com/content material/ac39b604-ef6d-41cb-bb8c-0eb76e002176 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111424
[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2024 ; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/994494 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/why-putin-remains-uninterested-meaningful-negotiations-ukraine ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111324
[4] https://meduza dot io/information/2024/09/10/neschastie-v-vide-nashih-razvodov-pozadi-propagandist-konstantin-malofeev-o-svadbe-s-mariey-lvovoy-belovoy-razyskivaetsya-mus
[5] https://www.rferl.org/a/malofeyev-russia-oligarch-finances-war-ukraine/32474096.html ; https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-oligarch-charged-violating-us-sanctions ; https://www.ft.com/content material/27125702-71ec-11e5-ad6d-f4ed76f0900a ; https://secretmag dot ru/enciklopediya/konstantin-malofeev.htm
[6] https://english.kyodonews.web/information/2024/12/2b04e9c88c84-urgent-n-korean-troops-in-russia-killed-zelenskyy-tells-kyodo-news.html
[7] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/12/02/absolyutnogo-zanurennya-u-pitmu-ne-bude-ekspert-pro-masovani-povitryani-udary-rf/
[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2024
[9] https://t.me/kpszsu/20480; https://t.me/kpszsu/20705 https://t.me/kpszsu/21537; https://t.me/kpszsu/21696 https://t.me/kpszsu/21782; https://t.me/kpszsu/21943; https://t.me/kpszsu/21984; https://t.me/kpszsu/22298; https://t.me/kpszsu/22329; https://t.me/kpszsu/22478; https://t.me/kpszsu/22640; https://t.me/kpszsu/23111; https://t.me/kpszsu/23330; https://t.me/kpszsu/23621; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12593 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/24043
[10] https://t.me/kpszsu/24043
[11] https://t.me/kpszsu/20480
[12] https://t.me/kpszsu/2404
[13] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/02/absolyutnogo-zanurennya-u-pitmu-ne-bude-ekspert-pro-masovani-povitryani-udary-rf/
[14] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8239
[15] https://t.me/sotaproject/90718 ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2024/12/02/1078420-kreml-nazval-zhelaemii-rezultat-edinoi-rossii-na-viborah ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7344159
[16] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6000 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2024
[17] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6000 ; https://tgstat dot ru/scores/channels/politics?type=members
[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2024
[19] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6000 ; https://tgstat dot ru/scores/channels/politics?type=members
[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2024
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024
[21] https://t.me/dva_majors/59087; https://t.me/motopatriot/29960; https://t.me/wargonzo/23460; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20232
[22] https://t.me/dva_majors/59087; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20232
[23] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/02/bredlisty-znyshhyly-dva-desyatka-odynycz-tehniky-desantnyky-shynkuyut-voroga-na-kurshhyni/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/01/ne-berezhut-ani-lyudej-ani-tehniku-na-kurshhyni-rosiyan-ne-zupynyayut-zhodni-vtraty/
[24] https://t.me/vchkogpu/52971
[25] https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/623
[26] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5271; https://www.fb.com/watch/?v=1764231850979039&rdid=pzdpuBlh8SVjdSD1
[27] https://t.me/otukharkiv/2890; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FLfihgNEALUgCPsbXxgtAnznLTjKGKAsEZjB6dRTVAJGBmCVboacGsSV9wAZnrVwl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0E2YpKexQvgF7GpYc5eFsQJ4v5qh29C8V9Y1yRwJdpJyVBdY4sJBqvaiioSoA7v4al; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aGtKcwcygXyVSsb3wxJSG1hbFjvRKp2rGToG6eZhCZAkH1rBonQUiyDBsywsttiSl; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/02/zaliznyj-shashlyk-na-mangalah-prygotovleno-5-tankiv-ta-6-bmp-gorilogo-rosijskogo-bruhtu-pobilshalo/
[28] https://t.me/dva_majors/59087; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20194 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20197 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20242; https://t.me/rybar/65961
[29] https://t.me/rybar/65961
[30] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81773
[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29881 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29874 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20197 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29973 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/288588
[32] https://t.me/dva_majors/59087 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11962
[33] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/02/ne-dijshly-do-richky-i-ne-kupayutsya-poblyzu-kupyanska-okupanty-zaznayut-maksymalnyh-vtrat/
[34] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0E2YpKexQvgF7GpYc5eFsQJ4v5qh29C8V9Y1yRwJdpJyVBdY4sJBqvaiioSoA7v4al ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aGtKcwcygXyVSsb3wxJSG1hbFjvRKp2rGToG6eZhCZAkH1rBonQUiyDBsywsttiSl
[35] https://t.me/voin_dv/12093; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/4235 (Zarichne); https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18188 ; https://t.me/sashakots/50517 (Terny)
[36] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FLfihgNEALUgCPsbXxgtAnznLTjKGKAsEZjB6dRTVAJGBmCVboacGsSV9wAZnrVwl
[37] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/02/zhyva-syla-dezertyruye-tikaye-i-navit-vchynyaye-samogubstvo-na-siverskomu-napryamku-okupantiv-ganyayut-po-polyu/
[38] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/41879 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/41876 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/41884
[39] https://t.me/shustryii_i/1335 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7711
[40] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FLfihgNEALUgCPsbXxgtAnznLTjKGKAsEZjB6dRTVAJGBmCVboacGsSV9wAZnrVwl ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0E2YpKexQvgF7GpYc5eFsQJ4v5qh29C8V9Y1yRwJdpJyVBdY4sJBqvaiioSoA7v4al ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aGtKcwcygXyVSsb3wxJSG1hbFjvRKp2rGToG6eZhCZAkH1rBonQUiyDBsywsttiSl ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146385 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20236 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23460
[41] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/02/pr-shturmy-voroga-v-rajoni-chasovogo-yaru-zajshly-postavyly-svoyu-ganchirku-vidkotylysya/
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20209
[43] https://x.com/AudaxonX/standing/1863567092353560786; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/194
[44] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60458
[45] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FLfihgNEALUgCPsbXxgtAnznLTjKGKAsEZjB6dRTVAJGBmCVboacGsSV9wAZnrVwl ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0E2YpKexQvgF7GpYc5eFsQJ4v5qh29C8V9Y1yRwJdpJyVBdY4sJBqvaiioSoA7v4al ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aGtKcwcygXyVSsb3wxJSG1hbFjvRKp2rGToG6eZhCZAkH1rBonQUiyDBsywsttiSl
[46] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/892991-rosijska-armia-vtracae-blizko-500-vijskovih-za-tizden-boiv-u-torecku-recnica-otu-lugansk/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/12/02/vtrachayut-bataljon-na-tyzhden-u-toreczku-kozhen-metr-prosuvannya-dayetsya-okupantam-velykoyu-krovyu/
[47] https://t.me/answertime1/107; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7706
[48] https://t.me/motopatriot/29944 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/59087 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20227 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29940 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146375
[49] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FLfihgNEALUgCPsbXxgtAnznLTjKGKAsEZjB6dRTVAJGBmCVboacGsSV9wAZnrVwl ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0E2YpKexQvgF7GpYc5eFsQJ4v5qh29C8V9Y1yRwJdpJyVBdY4sJBqvaiioSoA7v4al ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aGtKcwcygXyVSsb3wxJSG1hbFjvRKp2rGToG6eZhCZAkH1rBonQUiyDBsywsttiSl ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146375
[50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81772
[51] https://t.me/robert_magyar/974; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/23037; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7707 ; https://t.me/yokaiUA/188; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7708
[52] https://t.me/motopatriot/29944
[53] https://t.me/motopatriot/29970 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29944 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/20821 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/59087 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146438 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60443
[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81796 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60451
[55] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aGtKcwcygXyVSsb3wxJSG1hbFjvRKp2rGToG6eZhCZAkH1rBonQUiyDBsywsttiSl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0E2YpKexQvgF7GpYc5eFsQJ4v5qh29C8V9Y1yRwJdpJyVBdY4sJBqvaiioSoA7v4al; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FLfihgNEALUgCPsbXxgtAnznLTjKGKAsEZjB6dRTVAJGBmCVboacGsSV9wAZnrVwl; https://t.me/wargonzo/23460; https://t.me/motopatriot/29970
[56] https://t.me/motopatriot/29963; https://t.me/motopatriot/29970; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81776 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/59084 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/59100; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13047; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60443
[57] https://t.me/rusich_army/18976; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19811; https://t.me/rusich_army/18976
[58] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FLfihgNEALUgCPsbXxgtAnznLTjKGKAsEZjB6dRTVAJGBmCVboacGsSV9wAZnrVwl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0E2YpKexQvgF7GpYc5eFsQJ4v5qh29C8V9Y1yRwJdpJyVBdY4sJBqvaiioSoA7v4al; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aGtKcwcygXyVSsb3wxJSG1hbFjvRKp2rGToG6eZhCZAkH1rBonQUiyDBsywsttiSl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FLfihgNEALUgCPsbXxgtAnznLTjKGKAsEZjB6dRTVAJGBmCVboacGsSV9wAZnrVwl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0E2YpKexQvgF7GpYc5eFsQJ4v5qh29C8V9Y1yRwJdpJyVBdY4sJBqvaiioSoA7v4al; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aGtKcwcygXyVSsb3wxJSG1hbFjvRKp2rGToG6eZhCZAkH1rBonQUiyDBsywsttiSl
[59] https://t.me/voin_dv/12091
[60] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60446; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29878; https://t.me/motopatriot/29942; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81775; https://t.me/dva_majors/59091 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20225; https://t.me/dva_majors/59087 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29970;
[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/23468
[62] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aGtKcwcygXyVSsb3wxJSG1hbFjvRKp2rGToG6eZhCZAkH1rBonQUiyDBsywsttiSl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0E2YpKexQvgF7GpYc5eFsQJ4v5qh29C8V9Y1yRwJdpJyVBdY4sJBqvaiioSoA7v4al; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0FLfihgNEALUgCPsbXxgtAnznLTjKGKAsEZjB6dRTVAJGBmCVboacGsSV9wAZnrVwl
[63] https://t.me/rezhim_b/4542
[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20197 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23460
[65] https://t.me/dva_majors/59109
[66] https://t.me/rian_ru/271324 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/standing/1863469634751443151
[67]https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0E2YpKexQvgF7GpYc5eFsQJ4v5qh29C8V9Y1yRwJdpJyVBdY4sJBqvaiioSoA7v4al ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0aGtKcwcygXyVSsb3wxJSG1hbFjvRKp2rGToG6eZhCZAkH1rBonQUiyDBsywsttiSl
[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20220
[69] https://t.me/kpszsu/24043; https://t.me/kpszsu/24043
[70] https://t.me/gunpChernihiv/2918; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/892837-u-selah-kobizca-j-mala-divica-na-cernigivsini-vpali-sahedi-podrobici-rosijskoi-ataki-u-nic-na-2-grudna/ ; https://www.fb.com/DSNSTERNOPIL/posts/pfbid02fhC3rzrC6fFgEKb9ECpcBx4EHVdaDgWdE4ZdQnBecpmzWgJvfv96ZM4e2e9VtxD3l?ref=embed_post; https://suspilne dot media/ternopil/892717-u-ternopoli-cutno-zvuk-vibuhu/; https://suspilne dot media/ternopil/892789-ataka-droniv-v-ternopoli-v-oblasnij-vijskovij-administracii-povidomili-novi-podrobici/; https://www.fb.com/photograph/?fbid=998754955625727&set=pcb.998755088959047; https://suspilne dot media/ternopil/892739-ratuvalniki-opriludnili-foto-z-misca-vlucanna-bezpilotnika-v-ternopoli/
[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/146423 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/21791 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20226 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20240 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/20240
[72] https://suspilne dot media/892641-rf-za-misac-zastosuvala-proti-ukraini-347-raket-i-22-tisaci-sahediv-zelenskij/
[73] https://x.com/Hajun_BY/standing/1863543642536956055
[74] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2024
[75] https://t.me/tass_agency/288494; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/02/12/2024/674d5eab9a79478491346b75?from=from_main_3; http://redstar dot ru/v-interesah-povysheniya-boevoj-vyuchki/ ; https://meduza dot io/information/2024/12/02/v-minoborony-rf-rasskazali-o-podgotovke-v-polkah-rezerva-300-tysyach-kontraktnikov-dlya-uchastiya-v-voyne-v-ukraine ; https://t.me/sotaproject/90717
[76] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2024
[77] https://t.me/epoddubny/21792
[78] https://t.me/istories_media/8368 ; https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/tales/2024/12/02/srednyaya-regionalnaya-viplata-za-zaklyuchenie-kontrakta-s-minoboroni-virosla-za-god-bolee-chem-v-5-raz/index.html
[79] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2024
[80] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/23090
[81] https://t.me/tass_agency/288452 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/288457 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/288463 ; https://tass dot ru/interviews/22535029
[82] https://t.me/milinfolive/136439 ; https://t.me/misdronekb/105
