HTS-led coalition of opposition and insurgent teams: the Military Operations Command (MOC)
The coalition is led by HTS, the dominant armed group in northwest Syria that rose to prominence when it secured its management over the Idlib enclave after inner opposition preventing since 2017. During this time, HTS eradicated or absorbed different factions, usually forcing rival teams into Turkish-controlled territories within the north or absolutely dissolving them.
HTS’s efforts to distance itself from extremist ideologies additional formed its relationship with different Islamist factions. Offensives in opposition to teams like Hurras al-Din in late 2019 and Ahrar al-Sham in 2017 allowed HTS to both dissolve these rivals or absolutely subordinate them. The seize or killing of their leaders bolstered HTS’s management over Idlib.
While HTS was concerned in direct confrontation with insurgent and Islamist factions in addition to the previous regime forces in Idlib alongside the frontlines of Idlib enclave, its actions prolonged to the areas in northern Syria managed by Turkish-backed factions. ACLED information present a number of confrontations in northern Syria between HTS and its associates in opposition to completely different Turkish-backed factions of the Syrian National Army (JWS) (see map beneath). This included Jaysh al-Islam, a gaggle that used to function in Rural Damascus however was deported by the previous Syrian regime following the reconciliation agreements in 2018. This settlement moved the insurgent factions to northern Syria, consolidating the previous regime’s management within the south.
Turkish-backed factions (JWS)
JWS started to emerge alongside the start of the Turkish navy operation Euphrates Shield in opposition to IS in Syria in August 2016. While HTS engaged in periodic skirmishes with Turkish-backed forces, probably the most important confrontations involving JWS factions occurred in opposition to QSD. As a Kurdish-led alliance supported by the US and the Global Coalition, QSD governs a good portion of northeastern Syria. Its ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have made it a main goal of Turkish-led navy operations, which continuously contain JWS factions spearheading assaults on QSD-controlled areas in Aleppo, al-Raqqa, and Hasaka. The persistent sample of armed confrontations and distant violence between Turkish-backed JWS factions and QSD forces displays the broader wrestle over territorial management and political dominance in northern Syria. This deeply entrenched battle dynamic — rooted in longstanding Turkish opposition to QSD resulting from its hyperlinks to the PKK — is anticipated to endure effectively into the post-Assad period.
Syrian Democratic Forces (QSD)
QSD’s struggles lengthen past its battle with Turkish-backed factions. Its territories have seen persistent threats from Islamic State sleeper cells, notably in Dayr al-Zawr, al-Raqqa, and Hasaka. Meanwhile, former regime forces and their allies have periodically launched assaults from the Euphrates’ western financial institution, focusing on QSD positions and Coalition bases. With the autumn of the Syrian regime, its confrontations with QSD have successfully ended; nonetheless, Islamic State sleeper cells are prone to proceed their assaults in QSD-controlled areas following the identical patterns noticed lately.
Islamic State (IS)
The Islamic State exploited the desert terrain of central Syria to launch assaults in opposition to former regime forces and their militias. Following the regime’s collapse in these areas, the Islamic State is poised to take advantage of the ensuing safety vacuum, doubtlessly turning the central desert right into a hotspot of battle. Such developments might set off confrontations involving HTS-led factions or southern opposition teams, mirroring previous battles in Idlib, Daraa, and rural Damascus.
Southern Operation Room
While opposition teams in southern Syria have been inactive because the 2018 reconciliation settlement, they re-emerged in December through the opposition’s advances towards Damascus. This led to the creation of the Southern Operations group: an alliance of insurgent factions beforehand lively in southern Syria and at present supported by Druze fighters that represents one other important actor in Syria’s battle panorama. After the reconciliation settlement with the previous regime in 2018, many of those factions have been disbanded. Some fighters joined the eighth Brigade beneath the Russian-affiliated fifth Corps of the Syrian Army, whereas others shaped smaller teams to proceed resisting the previous regime forces. Before the reconciliation settlement, these factions had actively fought the Islamic State-affiliated Khalid ibn al-Walid Army in southwest Daraa, abandoning a legacy of unstable confrontations that will form future dynamics in case of an IS resurgence in Syria.
The offensive that led to Assad’s fall
The fall of the Syrian regime unfolded quickly, starting with a lightning offensive on 27 November by the MOC led by HTS. On 30 November, their forces seized the strategic metropolis of Aleppo, marking a turning level within the battle. With Aleppo beneath their management, the MOC shifted its focus southward, focusing on the town of Hama as the subsequent step in its march towards Damascus to topple Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
By 5 December, the HTS-led coalition had captured Hama and set their sights on Homs, a metropolis of vital significance. Homs served as an important hyperlink between the capital Damascus and the coastal strongholds of Lattakia and Tartus, areas central to Assad’s energy base. Within two days, on 7 December, the MOC declared full management over Homs, lowering the space between its forces and Damascus to lower than 200 kilometers.
Meanwhile, occasions within the south added to the previous regime’s unraveling. On the identical day Homs fell, factions from the Southern Operation Room, supported by Druze fighters, introduced their management over the governorates of Daraa, al-Suwayda, and Quneitra successfully encircling Damascus from each the north and the south and slicing off the regime’s remaining traces of protection.
What adopted was the regime’s ultimate collapse. Without resistance, native fighters from rural Damascus entered the capital within the early hours of 8 December. They have been quickly joined by MOC forces, marking the top of Assad’s reign as Damascus fell into opposition fingers with out an precise struggle.
With your complete territory of Syria now beneath opposition management, the brand new areas of affect amongst varied armed factions have began to crystallize. In the south, factions of the Southern Front dominate the three southern governorates, whereas QSD controls al-Raqqa, Hasaka, the jap countryside of Dayr al-Zawr and elements of Aleppo’s countryside, as of 11 December. Meanwhile, Turkish-backed forces keep a grip on the northern border areas, and the HTS-led coalition holds sway over the rest of the nation.
