The lightning-fast collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has despatched shock waves by the Middle East because the removing of the dictator whose household had dominated the nation with an iron fist for greater than half a century triggers a probably seismic shift within the regional steadiness of energy.
Stefan Wolff
Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham
But there are additionally essential repercussions past Syria and its neighbourhood, with Russia one of many extra considerably affected powers.
Back in 2015, when Assad’s regime was getting ready to collapse, it was saved by Russian navy intervention, with help from Iran and Hezbollah. Launched within the context of a rising risk from Islamic State, Russia enabled Assad’s regime to push again different insurgent forces as properly.
Over the years that adopted, Moscow enabled Assad to consolidate management over the capital and different key cities, and, particularly, within the coastal area the place Russia had two navy bases.
The undeniable fact that Moscow was unable to save lots of an essential ally like Assad exposes important weaknesses in Russia’s capacity to behave, somewhat than simply discuss, like an incredible energy.
The future of those bases is now unsure. The Russian naval base in Tartus — which dates again to Soviet instances — in addition to an air base at Hmeimim, established to the southeast of Latakia in 2015, have been important property for Russia to challenge navy power within the Mediterranean sea and bolster the Kremlin’s declare to Russian great-power standing.
Given the significance of the bases for Russia and the numerous investments made over time propping up the regime, Assad’s fall displays badly on Russia’s capabilities to claim credible affect on the worldwide stage.
Even if Russia by some means manages to barter a take care of Syria’s new rulers over the way forward for its navy bases, the truth that Moscow was unable to save lots of an essential ally like Assad exposes important weaknesses in Russia’s capacity to behave, somewhat than simply discuss, like an incredible energy.
There are clear intelligence failures that both missed or misinterpreted the build-up of anti-Assad forces by Qatar, with Turkey’s tacit help. These failures have been then compounded by diminished Russian navy property in Syria and an lack of ability to strengthen them at quick discover. This is, after all, as a result of Russia’s ongoing conflict in opposition to Ukraine.
The depletion of the navy capabilities of two different Kremlin allies within the area — Iran and Hezbollah — additional compounded the difficulties for Assad and exacerbated the impact of Russia’s overstretch. This additionally raises the query of whether or not Russia strategically misjudged the state of affairs and underestimated its vulnerability in Syria.
Vladimir Putin welcomes Bashar al-Assad throughout their assembly within the Black sea resort of Sochi, Russia, 20 November 2017. Photo: EPA-EFE/MICHAEL KLIMENTYEV/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN / POOL
But much more so, it highlights Russia’s personal dependence on allies who don’t merely acquiesce to Moscow’s calls for — as Assad did when he supplied Russia its navy bases — however who actively help a wannabe nice energy that lacks a number of the means to claim its claimed standing — as Iran and Hezbollah did in 2015.
For all of the discuss of a “no limits” partnership between Moscow and Beijing, China finally did nothing to save lots of Russia from an embarrassing defeat in Syria.
Missing from this equation is China. While Beijing had sided with Assad after the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, this help was largely of the rhetorical form. It was primarily aimed toward stopping a UN-backed, Western-led intervention akin to the one in Libya that led to the autumn of Gaddafi and has plunged the nation into chaos ever since.
A high-profile go to by Assad to China in September 2023 resulted in a strategic partnership settlement, which appeared to sign one other step in direction of the rehabilitation of the Syrian regime, in Beijing’s eyes a minimum of. But when push got here to shove and Assad’s rule was below extreme risk, China did nothing to save lots of him.
This raises an essential query concerning the Chinese judgment of the Syrian regime and the evolving disaster, however there may be additionally a broader level right here concerning Russia’s great-power ambitions.
For all of the discuss of a “no limits” partnership between Moscow and Beijing, China finally did nothing to save lots of Russia from an embarrassing defeat in Syria. Where Russia wanted a navy presence to bolster its claims to great-power standing, Chinese pursuits within the Middle East are primarily about financial alternative and combatting the perceived risk of Islamist terrorism.
This clearly restricted Beijing’s urge for food to change into extra concerned, not to mention to bail out Assad.
Russia’s place within the Middle East now could be in peril. Moscow has misplaced a key ally in Assad and its different major allies, Iran and Hezbollah, are considerably weakened. By distinction, Israel and Turkey, with whom the Kremlin has not had straightforward relations over the previous few years, have been strengthened.
This exposes the hollowness of Russian claims to great-power standing. It can be more likely to additional diminish Russian status and the standing that it has within the eyes of its different companions — whether or not that be China, North Korea, its fellow BRICS members, or international locations within the Global South that Russia has just lately tried to woo.
The penalties of that for Ukraine — arguably the primary supply of Russia’s over-stretch — are more likely to be negligible. On the one hand, the convenience with which Assad was deposed demonstrates that Russia isn’t invincible and that its help of brutal dictatorships has limits. On the opposite hand, there ought to now be no expectation of something aside from Russia doubling down in Ukraine.
Putin wants a hit that restores home and worldwide confidence in him — and quick. After all, Donald Trump doesn’t like losers.
This article was first revealed by The Conversation. Views expressed in opinion items don’t essentially replicate the place of Novaya Gazeta Europe.
