Necessity is the mom of invention, and Ukraine continues to push this adage to new heights of technical and tactical ingenuity in using aerial drone know-how to battle the Russian invasion.
After having dramatically reshaped the tactical fight on land since their introduction by Ukrainian forces within the spring of 2023, extremely maneuverable first-person view (FPV) drones have quickly turn out to be a key asset in Ukraine’s counter-drone efforts as an increasing number of Ukrainian items make use of them to intercept Russian fixed-wing reconnaissance drones.
Since May 2024, this writer has visually confirmed virtually 650 interceptions of this kind – principally going down at a distance of 1,000-3,000 meters – throughout your complete frontline utilizing open-source info launched by a wide range of sources, together with social media channels and accounts of Ukrainian items, humanitarian organizations, and extra. Similarly, the Tochnyi collective challenge has just lately documented and geolocated greater than 850 interceptions of Russian drones by Ukrainian FPVs, additional corroborating this development. The actual variety of Russian unmanned aerial techniques, or UAS, shot down with this method is probably going increased, contemplating that not all interceptions are recorded or publicly disclosed.
Despite receiving little consideration throughout the mainstream media, Ukraine’s more and more profitable use of FPV drones as C-UAS interceptors is a extremely consequential improvement as a result of it immediately removes Russia’s essential ISR property from the battlefield, eroding its forces’ situational consciousness in addition to capability to detect targets, breaking a key hyperlink within the Russian kill-chain.
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Without adequate and chronic “eyes” within the sky, Russia struggles to well timed and repeatedly feed goal info to its huge fires arsenal. This, in flip, affords Ukraine some respite from each Russian artillery and missile strikes in opposition to a wide range of targets, together with high-payoff ones at operational depth, equivalent to ground-based air defenses and airfields, that Russia usually assaults with Iskander M tactical ballistic missiles.
At the identical time, fewer drones within the skies negatively have an effect on using different strike capabilities equivalent to loitering munitions that immediately or not directly rely on reside reconnaissance, fast goal acquisition and signal-relay capabilities. The progressive discount in documented Lancet strikes previously three months appears no mere coincidence, as this notorious loitering munition operates in hunter-killer groups with Zala reconnaissance drones from the identical producer. This is nice information for Ukrainian formations working alongside and close to the frontline, specifically artillery items, which have suffered important losses to Lancet strikes. Ukrainian FPV operators even managed to intercept a couple of Lancets, with 15 instances visually confirmed by this writer.
Equally vital, capturing down extra Russian ISR drones additionally blunts Russia’s capability to conduct correct battle harm evaluation, an important activity that’s usually missed in discussions.
Another main implication is the fee effectiveness and operational flexibility of utilizing FPV drone interceptors, that are cheaper than some other kinetic resolution at Ukraine’s disposal and simple to provide, distribute, and deploy even throughout a dispersed power. While the idea of utilizing drones to kinetically defeat different drones just isn’t new, Kyiv’s forces have been the primary to make use of it in actual fight and at scale. The demand for FPV drones has by no means been so excessive and drone producers such because the Wild Hornets together with many non-public crowdfunding initiatives are delivering hundreds of platforms every month to frontline items.
The skyrocketing use of FPV drones has additionally fueled unprecedented fight experimentation and ways refinement, ensuing within the institution of specialised FPV air protection items inside a number of Ukrainian brigades and fast technological iteration cycles. The flip facet is that there’s a minimum of one human operator behind any single interception, making it a personnel-intensive course of depending on expert operators. Flying an FPV drone requires intensive coaching and follow, notably when conducting high-speed maneuvers or partaking shifting targets.
This is the place automated terminal steering ought to come into play to considerably expedite and enhance the last-mile engagement course of. Ukrainian forces are already utilizing automated instruments to detect, determine, and observe Russian ISR drones, however they now have to combine scalable AI-enabled pc imaginative and prescient within the terminal part as Russia deploys extra UAS. Such capabilities may also make the FPV drone extra resilient in opposition to digital warfare.
NATO and particular person allies ought to take inventory of those technological and tactical improvements and put money into drone-based, cost-effective interceptors to enrich their C-UAS capabilities.
The evaluation of collected knowledge additionally supplies some fascinating insights into Russia’s drone capabilities and use as a part of its present operations.
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First, the Russian navy depends on a largely standardized fleet of medium-size reconnaissance UAS for its tactical and operational ISR, centered round three essential fixed-wing platforms: the Zala 421, the Supercam 350, and the Orlan household, which contains the Orlan 10 and 30 variants. The Zala 421 accounts for the overwhelming majority of Ukraine’s FPV-based interceptions (54%), making this mannequin the brand new workhorse of Russia’s ISR drone fleet, adopted by the Supercam (28%) and Orlan 10/30 (12%) household of techniques. This standardized strategy facilitates drone manufacturing on an industrial scale – a lot bigger than the volumes any Western nation is at present manufacturing – simplifies coaching and logistics, and reduces the probability of interoperability points throughout the Russian navy. In this respect, it’s arduous to not respect the lesson for the United States and NATO allies.
Second, the Russian forces are usually not standing idly by and are beginning to mimic Ukrainian options – albeit on a a lot smaller scale – whereas additionally taking precautions to guard their ISR drones from Ukrainian FPVs. Their countermeasures, nonetheless, appear to have little success up to now. These vary from easy camouflage and faux Ukrainian shade schemes to extra subtle instruments equivalent to small radio-frequency jammers put in on drones with a view to disrupt the video hyperlink between the operator and the FPV interceptor because it approaches the Russian UAS. The Russians are additionally equipping a few of their drones with rear-looking wide-angle cameras to detect incoming Ukrainian FPV drones and provides the pilot sufficient time to make use of evasive maneuvers to keep away from the interceptor and escape utilizing its longer endurance. Still, Ukrainian counter-tactics are additionally evolving and embrace the launch of tandem interceptors to maximise possibilities of success and assault Russian drones with fast-ascending maneuvers from under to stay outdoors the drone cameras’ discipline of view.
Ukraine’s present benefit in using FPV drones is proving vital however could also be short-lived as Russia develops new countermeasures.
Federico Borsari is a resident fellow within the Transatlantic Defense and Security program on the Center for European Policy Analysis.
